Introduction
In the mid 1970's Samuel Huntington predicted that the new middle classes in many advanced industrial states would become more restless and "post-industrial politics" less benign (1974; also Crozier, Huntington and Watanuki 1975) . The accumulated evidence provides some support for that prediction; citizens in a number of states have become more inclined to publicly express their dissatisfaction with governments (Inglehart 1997; Klingemann 1999; Dalton 1999) . Occasional citizen dissatisfaction with a particular government is neither unusual nor necessarily problematic. More problematical is the possibility that deep and sustained dissatisfaction might corrode regime support. The worry is that dissatisfaction with particular governments might turn into dissatisfaction with the workings of democracy more generally.
What are the determinants of dissatisfaction with governments? And, what is the connection between citizens' evaluations of government performance and their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the workings of democracy more generally? This analysis examines these two separate but closely related questions. Neither research question is new, but we depart from conventional approaches in three respects. First, we argue that contemporary explanations for dissatisfaction with governments may pay insuf cient attention to the structure of authority patterns. Following Eckstein (1966, 1969) , we explore the possibility that discrepancies in authority patterns have signi cant independent effects on levels of citizen satisfaction and dissatisfaction with governments.
Second, prevailing explanations of variations in diffuse support focus primarily on the importance of institutions (Newton and Norris 2000) . Citizens' assessments of their political systems may not always be "of a piece." As Norris observes, publics can, and do, "distinguish between different levels of the regime, often believing strongly in democratic values, for example, while proving critical of the way that democratic governments work in practice" (1999a:9). Public con dence in political institutions undoubtedly is crucial to the vitality of democratic life, but so are political actors. What is less certain, and what is open to investigation, is whether it is outlooks towards political institutions rather than political actors that are more important determinants of citizen satisfaction with the workings of democracy.
Researchers investigating these two broad questions have relied primarily on empirical evidence from advanced industrial states. There is no reason to suppose that the dynamics driving citizen satisfaction and dissatisfaction in wealthy well established democratic states would be the same as those driving citizens' evaluations of their governments in poorer countries with briefer experiences with democratic practices. The third goal of this analysis, then, is to broaden the eld of investigation and to use data from the 2000 World Values Surveys to test the extent to which hypotheses derived from different theoretical perspectives hold up in both advanced industrial states and less wealthy ones.
Theoretical Orientation
Most analysts of contemporary democratic life in western states do not claim that democracy is in crisis (Norris 1999; Klingemann and Fuchs 1995; Kaase and Newton 1995) , but they do suggest that most citizens believe that all is not well (Putnam, Pharr and Dalton 2000:27) . A variety of explanations have been suggested to account for the most critical sources of citizen discontent.
Some explanations focus on value change. In one of the most prominent variations of this line of reasoning, Ronald Inglehart argues that "mass values and attitudes are a major in uence on whether or not democratic institutions survive in a given society" (2000:225) . Much of Inglehart's research indicates that the core values of publics are changing and these changes have consequences for what people want out of life and what citizens expect of governments. Raised under conditions of material and physical security, post-war generations have shifted away from a preoccupation with basic material needs towards postmaterialist concerns (Inglehart 1990 (Inglehart , 1997 . Postmaterialist values embrace a variety of "higher order" concerns including a preference for more open government. The sheer volume and consistency of the evidence in support of this value change theory is impressive. The same basic nding emerges in nearly every country for which there are systematic data: those segments of the publics holding postmaterialist values are more critical of traditional hierarchical institutions and consistently more likely to engage in elite challenging behaviors. Moreover, Inglehart's account goes considerable distance towards explaining why the relationship between levels of material wealth in a society and levels of public satisfaction with governments is not a simple linear one.
A second explanation focuses more on how structural changes (Clarke and Rempel 1997) have contributed to rising levels of cognitive mobilization (Dalton 1984 (Dalton , 2002 Inglehart 1990 ). The cognitive mobilization explanation draws attention to how the accumulation of skills and resources of an increasingly well educated middle class and the combined effects of these changes promote rising levels of citizen engagement (Dalton 1984:267) . Wider access to higher levels of formal education is particularly signi cant because higher levels of formal education have important consequences for citizen outlooks and behavior (Nie, Junn and Stehlik-Barry 1996) . One is that they provide individuals with a greater capacity to organize information and to be more independent in the interpretation and use of that information (see also, Dalton and Wattenberg, 1993) . Higher levels of formal education are also associated with greater interest in politics, and greater interest supplies the motivation to seek out more information. These publics are not only more interested in, and knowledgeable about, their civic worlds, they are also more inclined to be active and critical.
A third socio-cultural explanation for why public satisfaction with governments and politics might be in short supply is the erosion in levels of social capital (Putnam 1995 Norris 2001 ). Social capital concerns both social networks and the norms of reciprocity that lubricate those networks, in particular interpersonal trust. Putnam argues that it is the technological transformation of leisure that is responsible for declining levels of civic engagement and undermining social trust, and the effects of these transformations have made it even more dif cult for governments to govern. Regardless of whether the erosion of social capital is directly attributable to new modes of leisure, the evidence showing that citizens with weak social capital, low interpersonal trust, exhibit levels of satisfaction with government that are signi cantly lower than those where people enjoy higher levels of social capital is remarkably consistent (Putnam 1993 (Putnam , 1995 .
These three accounts of the changing dynamics between citizens and government have become well-established explanations for good reasons. They are plausible, they are rmly grounded in well-established theory, and each is backed by an impressive body of empirical evidence. Even so, it is not clear that these accounts exhaust all of the explanatory possibilities and, in our view, there is a fourth possible explanation that warrants some consideration. The origins of this alternative explanation reach back to the seminal work of Harry Eckstein (1966, 1969 ).
Eckstein's theorizing began with the observation that authority orientations are a fundamental axis of political life. Drawing upon con gurative case studies of Norway, Britain and Germany, Eckstein argued that an explanation for the presence of democratic stability in some countries, but not others, is attributable to the presence or absence of congruence in the authority patterns in society. 1 Eckstein's initial preoccupation was in demonstrating that the roots of democratic stability could be explained by the extent to which family and political authority patterns were congruent. Pateman (1970) later demonstrated that this general line of reasoning could also be extended and applied to the link between authority patterns in the workplace and those in the polity. And other research more recently suggests that authority patterns in the workplace are also systematically connected to those in the family (Nevitte 1996) .
It is Eckstein and Gurr's (1975) later investigations that turned to focus on what consequences discrepant authority patterns might have for support for governments and legitimacy, and these directly inform the core hypothesis explored here. Congruent authority patterns, Eckstein and Gurr contend, foster allegiance to governments whereas inconsistencies in authority patterns have the potential to undermine public satisfaction with governments and imperil that allegiance (Eckstein and Gurr 1975:450) . This innovative theorizing about authority patterns represented an important advance in empirical democratic theory, but the empirical foundations of these claims were almost entirely grounded in case studies. While quite speci c hypotheses about variations in citizen satisfaction can be readily deduced from this theory, these hypotheses have not, to our knowledge, been subject to rigorous empirical testing with systematic cross-national evidence. Our goals are to draw on the insights from this earlier body of theory, to recast the central propositions in the form of testable hypotheses, and to investigate those hypotheses using recent WVS data from multiple countries. We evaluate the contribution of this alternative perspective by placing the empirical ndings inspired by the Eckstein perspective in the context of those coming from the three more contemporary theories outlined above.
Data and Methods
The World Values Surveys (WVS) are a useful data source for testing hypotheses about authority orientations, views about government performance and democratic satisfaction for a combination of reasons. First, these surveys contain data from multiple countries and the same core set of questions asked in each country has been designed to ensure crossnational equivalence. The WVS include well-tested measures for each of the theoretical concepts that are central to this analysis. Furthermore, the WVS use the same standard methodologies for sampling and data collection techniques, and the timing of the data collection was deliberately coordinated to maximize comparability. Consequently, we can be reasonably con dent that the WVS yield data that meet the necessary standards of cross national comparability.
Eckstein and Gurr's claim that discrepancies in authority orientations contribute to dissatisfaction in citizen evaluations of a government's performance is not a proposition they limit to advanced industrial states. To test the generalizabilty of that claim, we examine data from eight countries (n = 11,739) that vary signi cantly with respect to their institutional make-up, the extent of their experience with democratic practices, and levels of wealth: Argentina, Canada, Chile, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Spain, and the United States.
2 The details of how each variable is operationalized are documented in Appendix A. The baseline measure of people's orientations to political authority is operationalized by using the ve-item political action index (Marsh and Kaase 1979). The assumption is that people's views toward political authority are re ected in their willingness to challenge political authority. For comparative purposes, the scale scores are standardized (range from 0 to 1, where 1 = a strong willingness to challenge political authority). To compare whether, and how, citizens' orientations towards authority vary across different domains we consider ve additional measures all of which are standardized (0 = a high level of deference, to 1 = low level of deference). These codings correspond to that used in the baseline index. The rst indicator, is greater respect for authority in the future a good thing or a bad thing, taps general orientations toward authority. Two indicators tap attitudes toward authority in the family: Do respondents feel it is important to teach children about obedience in the home? And should one always love and respect their parents, or only when they have earned it? The two remaining indicators measure orientations toward authority in the workplace: Who should own and participate in the management of business and industry -owners and government, or employees? And, when should one follow instructions at work -always, even when one does not fully agree with them, or only when one is convinced they are right?
Findings
The place to begin is with the basic aggregate data. As Figure 1 shows, there are signi cant cross-national variations with respect to citizens' orientations towards the baseline measure of political authority. The willingness of publics to challenge political authority is positively related to aggregate income levels. In effect, every $10,000 increase in GDP/capita, corresponds to a .3 increase on the willingness to challenge political authority index. These results are entirely consistent with other ndings (Welzel and Inglehart 2001; Welzel, Inglehart and Klingemann 2001) and they suggest that citizen inclinations to challenge political authority is a basic trait of open societies, and open societies tend to be more prosperous. Signi cantly, however, the willingness of publics to challenge political authority is not a proxy for public satisfaction with democracy. These WVS data show, for example, that the highest levels of public satisfaction with democracy are found in Spain, but the Spanish rank fourth, well behind publics in the United States, Canada and Japan, on their willingness to challenge authority. Similarly, Japan ranks third on willingness to challenge authority but they rank well below publics in six other countries in their levels of satisfaction with democracy.
Variations in aggregate outlooks toward authority clearly do distinguish publics in less developed countries from their counterparts in advanced industrial states, but the core component of the Eckstein and Gurr hypothesis that relates authority orientations to levels of satisfaction with governments is primarily concerned with discrepancies between political authority orientations and authority orientations in other domains. The rst point to establish is: To what extent, in each of these eight countries, is there evidence of discrepancies between orientations towards political authority and such other authority orientations as those in the family and the workplace? Figure 2 reports the aggregate mean differences between each country's average score on the baseline index -willingness to challenge political authority -and their national average scores on each of the ve additional indicators of authority orientations. Several relevant ndings emerge. First, the presence of discrepancies in authority orientations is clearly not atypical. In fact, there are statistically signi cant differences between orientations towards political authority and authority orientations in other domains in about 95% of the cases examined. more deferential to political authority than they are in their outlooks to authority in the other domains. Third, given the wide variations in cultural settings and regime styles of the eight countries, there are some remarkably consistent cross-national patterns with respect to the distributions of some outlooks. For example, regardless of national setting, most people exhibit greater respect for parental gures, and for authority in general, than they do for political authority. When it comes to child rearing and workplace participation, however, the opposite pattern typically holds. There is also some evidence of cultural af nities. The American and Canadian cases, for example, are nearly always closely clustered together, and in these two instances nearly all of the discrepancies have a negative valence. The Mexican and Argentinean ndings also typically cluster together but more often than not they cluster towards the positive polarity; they are positive discrepancies These aggregate mean scores, of course, mask the extent to which there are variations in distributions of authority orientations within national populations. A more detailed portrait of national variations, however, points to important nuances (see Appendix B). In every society, regardless of which combination of authority patterns are considered, there is usually a balance of positive and negative discrepancies. Thus, although most Spaniards are generally more inclined to support greater employee participation in workplace decision-making than they are likely to challenge political authority (Figure 2) , there is nonetheless a healthy proportion of Spaniards (16%) who indicate that they are less supportive of greater worker participation in the workplace (Appendix B). In no country is there complete unanimity on these authority dimensions.
These ndings provide empirical grounding for the claims made by Eckstein and others that authority patterns vary signi cantly across different societies and domains. But signi cantly, Eckstein and his colleagues provide no commentary about the possibility that there may be different varieties of discrepant authority patterns. Consequently, they provide no guidance on the possibility that different kinds of discrepancies might have different consequences.
It is quite conceivable, for instance, that qualitative differences in the disjuncture of authority patterns could have quite different effects on citizen evaluations of government performance. For example, citizens who are less deferential outside of the polity (multiple positive discrepancies) may be more likely than others to express greater dissatisfaction with government because political authority patterns are more constraining than those experienced in the family and workplace. Conversely, citizens who are more inclined to defer to authority in their everyday lives (multiple negative discrepancies) may be less inclined than others to feel, and express, their dissatisfaction with governments or challenge the status quo. The implication is that there are at least two variations of the core hypothesis worth investigating:
Hypothesis 1a: Citizens with a pattern of multiple positive discrepancies (who are less deferential in the workplace, the family, and in general authority outlooks, than in the polity) will express less satisfaction with the performance of governments.
Alternatively:

Hypothesis 1b: Citizens with a pattern of multiple negative discrepancies (who are more deferential in the workplace, the family, and in general authority outlooks, than in the polity) will express greater satisfaction with the performance of governments.
The ndings reported in Figure 3 provide support for both of these hypotheses. The 2000 WVS asked respondents about their satisfaction with the way that people in (government) were handling their country's affairs. The data show that variations in citizens' satisfaction with governments depends not only on the scope but also on the direction of the discrepancies in authority patterns. The greater the number of positive discrepancies the less satisfaction there is with government performance, and the greater the number of negative discrepancies, the greater the level of satisfaction with government performance. Indeed, the magnitude of these differences is striking; multiple discrepancies in either direction appear to have the potential of in uencing evaluations of government performance by a considerable amount. These results is striking consistent in two respects. First, the very same patterns emerge regardless of which combination of authority orientations are compared. And second, these ndings consistently hold up regardless of whether citizens live in wealthy advanced industrial states with long democratic traditions or in poorer countries with briefer experiences with democratic practices (see Appendix C).
What is required, however, is a direct test of the second hypothesis, namely, that discrepant authority patterns contribute to variations in levels of public satisfaction with governments. But the clear evidence indicating that the two different types of discrepancies have identi ably different effects, suggests that separate hypotheses, one for each type of discrepancy, should be speci ed and tested. As follows:
Hypothesis 2a: Positive discrepancies in authority patterns will have an independent effect that decreases citizen satisfaction with the performance of governments.
And,
Hypothesis 2b: Negative discrepancies in authority patterns will have an independent effect that increases citizen satisfaction with the performance of governments.
It is possible, of course, that the apparent links between discrepancies in authority patterns and variations in satisfaction with governments are confounded and mediated by, or just derivative of, other sources of variation in levels of satisfaction with governments. For instance, the bivariate relationships between discrepant authority orientations and dissatisfaction with government might simply be attributable to more complex relationships between authority orientations and the distributions of postmaterialist value orientations, cognitive mobility or social capital. The only convincing way to show that authority orientations provide a credible alternative explanation for variations in satisfaction with governments is to demonstrate that discrepant authority orientations have signi cant net effects on variations in satisfaction with governments. That is, it must be demonstrated that discrepancies in authority patterns have a signi cant impact on citizen satisfaction with governments after the effects of such other explanations as postmaterialist orientations, cognitive mobility, and social capital, have been taken into account. To evaluate that proposition we turn to a multivariate model to isolate the impact of discrepancies in authority patterns on levels of satisfaction with government performance. The model controls both for the effects that might be attributable to other explanations and for such other individual attributes as age, sex and income.
The results reported in Table 1 indicate a number of important ndings. First, both positive and negative discrepancies turn out to have signi cant effects on evaluations of government performance, after the impact of other explanations and various socio-demographic factors are taken into account. In effect, with each additional positive discrepancy, the odds of that individual being satis ed with their government's performance decrease by as much as 39%. Conversely, with each additional negative discrepancy, the chances of being more satis ed with government performance more than double. Second, when the model is unpacked and the same tests are performed separately for both publics in advanced industrial states and less developed countries, the same general ndings emerge. Not surprisingly, there is some evidence of variation in the extent to which the same predictors have an impact on satisfaction with governments in wealthier or poorer settings. But the general nding is quite clear. The absence of congruence in authority patterns consistently emerges as a signi cant predictor of variations in support for governments even after the effects of other explanations and individual socio-economic characteristics are accounted for. In short, these data provide substantial support for the Eckstein and Gurr theory that authority patterns shape citizen satisfaction with governments.
To this point, the analysis has focused on sharpening our understanding of what factors explain variations in a certain type of speci c support, citizens' levels of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the performance of people in government. But to what extent do variations in this type of speci c support help to account for variations in citizens' diffuse support (Easton 1965; Kornberg and Clarke 1992; Norris 1999; Nevitte 2002) ? The prevailing perception is that citizens' evaluations of how people in government perform is less important to their satisfaction with the workings Table 1 Logistic Regression -Determinants of Government Satisfaction .49
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. of democracy than is con dence in government institutions. The argument is that because political actors are transient, what really counts when it comes to regime support is strong public con dence in government institutions. According to Norris and Newton, "politicians come and go with swings of the electoral pendulum," but a "loss of con dence in institutions may well be a better indicator of public disaffection with the modern world because they are the basic pillars of society. If they begin to crumble, then there is, indeed, cause for concern" (Newton and Norris 2000:53) . The hypothesis expressing this expectation would be: (Table 2) , government satisfaction becomes a key independent variable, along with con dence in government institutions. Two additional controls are imported into the model. The "life satisfaction" control is introduced to minimize the variation attributable to generalized feeling of satisfaction, and the "feelings towards democracy" control is entered for similar reasons (see Abramson and Inglehart 1998) .
The results reported in Table 2 show public con dence in political institutions is a signi cant predictor of democratic satisfaction. They also show that satisfaction with how people in government "handle the country's affairs" has a signi cant effect on democratic satisfaction overall. Indeed, the impact of the "people in government" variable turns out to be a much stronger predictor of democratic satisfaction than is citizen con dence in various governmental institutions (parliament, the civil service and parties) after contextual and sociodemographic factors are taken into account. Satisfaction with government of cials increases the chances of democratic satisfaction by more than ve times, more than three times the impact of con dence in institutions. Moreover, these same general patterns hold when the same tests are conducted separately for advanced industrial states and for less developed countries albeit with minor variations. Some intriguing differences emerge when the data for advanced industrial states are compared with those for less developed countries (LDC) are probed in greater detail. The con dence in institutions variable is routinely used as an additive index of responses to questions about con dence in three different governmental institutions -parliament, civil service, and political parties. When the index is disaggregated and multivariate tests are conducted separately for each institution, the results show that con dence in political parties is a signi cantly stronger predictor of democratic satisfaction in LDC whereas con dence in parliament is a stronger predictor of democratic satisfaction in advanced industrial states. The implication is that party building is a more effective strategy for promoting general regime support in LDC. On balance, however, these ndings lead us to reject the third hypothesis.
Concluding Discussion
We began by indicating that theories of value change, cognitive mobilization, and social capital, all provide compelling explanations for the changing dynamics between citizens and their governments. But we also suggested that another explanation for citizen dissatisfaction with governments can be deduced from an earlier theoretical framework developed by Eckstein and his colleagues, and that this explanation requires some investigation. Eckstein's core expectation was that citizens will be less satis ed with government when political authority patterns are not congruent with the authority patterns elsewhere in society. Our empirical test of that proposition provides general support for Eckstein's theory. Using WVS data from eight countries, it is clear that there are signi cant discrepancies in the authority orientations of publics in these countries. But the evidence also suggests that the original formulation of Eckstein's theory requires respeci cation in at least one important respect. The ndings indicate there are two different kinds of discrepancies in authority patterns; negative discrepancies and positive discrepancies. In the case of negative discrepancies, citizens are less deferential in their political authority orientations than in their authority orientations towards the family and workplace. In the case of positive discrepancies, citizens are more deferential in the political domain than they are in others. It is not clear that Eckstein and colleagues anticipated these qualitative differences in types of discrepancies, but they turn out to have substantively important consequences for citizens' evaluations of governments.
The second set of signi cant ndings indicate that where there are positive discrepancies in authority patterns, citizen satisfaction with the performance of governments declines. And where there are negative discrepancies, citizen satisfaction with the performance of governments increases. These results are remarkably consistent. They apply equally to publics in advanced industrial states and LDC. Each pattern has the same impact on citizen's evaluations of government performance regardless of whether the national setting is more or less prosperous. The implication is that the re-speci ed theory is a generalizable one.
The results indicate, generally, that the value change, cognitive mobilization and social capital explanations for variations in public support for governments work as one would predict. The ndings are not identical in every detail in every national setting, but the overall pattern is consistent. The evidence also suggests that discrepant authority orientations is an explanation that does not compete with others; it is an explanation that complements others. Empirically, discrepant authority orientations clearly account for signi cant additional variation in citizen dissatisfaction with governments even after other explanations are taken into account.
There is virtually no conclusive evidence indicating that public support for democratic principles has eroded (Fuchs, Guidorossi and Stevensson 1995; Fuchs and Klingemann 1995) . Nonetheless, many analysts continue to express concern about public support for, and con dence in, the core institutions of democratic government (Newton and Norris 2000; Norris 1999a; Nye, Zelikow and King 1997) . The reasonable presumption is that these institutions mediate citizens' evaluations of regime support. One inference that might be made from our ndings is that public satisfaction with the quality of democratic life might be improved by institutional design, by adjusting governmental institutions to correspond with social authority patterns. The prospect is an intriguing one. But it is not at all clear that priming public con dence in governmental institutions is a suf cient remedy. Con dence in governmental institutions does shape citizen satisfaction with democratic life. But our data also show that citizen satisfaction with the quality of democratic life is affected even more powerfully by their evaluations of how "people in government are handling the country's affairs." The implication is that while institutions matter, so do political actors.
